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Abstract
We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract
in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral “work values”. Individuals’
self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors
to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences.
We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribu-
tion are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of “social cohesion”
and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are
held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and
hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of differ-
ent sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with
well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the interplay between work ethics, sentiments and social policy. We present
a model where agents have standards of behavior relative to which they judge the actions of others,
increasing their regard for those who exceed the standard and decreasing it for those who fall short.
Similarly, according to social psychologists, agents’ self-esteem is affected by their own deviations
from moral standards in much the same way.1 As agents’ sentiments change, so, too, will their
behavior. Moreover, this is likely to affect their view of the benefits of social programs and the
worthiness of participants. The converse is true as well: social policies or institutions – the social
contract – generally affect behavior and this, in turn, affects sentiments, as described above. Therefore,
sentiments, behavior and social institutions must be determined jointly.
To study this interaction, we extend the model by Meltzer and Richard (1981) of rational voting
over redistributive taxes to include endogenous sentiments. In their model, agents supply labor in
return for competitive wages, and earnings are subject to a purely redistributive proportional tax.
The tax structure is determined by majority rule and reflects the preferences of the median voter.
Agents are assumed to be purely egoistic and the median income is below the mean. Under these
circumstances, if labor supply were inelastic, the resulting tax policy would be fully confiscatory.
However, since labor supply is endogenous and agents foresee the disincentive effects of taxation, they
will temper their demands for redistribution and adopt a more moderate tax structure. An important
implication of the model is that higher income inequality necessarily leads to greater equilibrium
redistribution.
In contrast, we assume that agents are altruistic and that sentiments are determined endogenously.
We assume agents evaluate their own performance and that of others relative to the work standard,
increasing their regard for those who exceed the standard and decreasing it for those who fall short.2
As a benchmark we take the mean labor supply to be the moral standard. Formally, we consider a
continuum of agents who differ in their productivities. For simplicity, we assume there are only two
types of individuals, skilled and unskilled, with the latter comprising more than half of the population.
Agents have private preferences over consumption and leisure and social preferences that take into
consideration the welfare of others. In addition, private preferences depend on self-esteem which is
1The impact on self-esteem and self-worth derives from the emotions of guilt and pride, which are referred to as self-
regulative emotions by social psychologists because they induce reparative or self-correcting behavior. This is discussed
below in Sections 2 and 3.
2The importance of work values is demonstrated by the fact that within the OECD approximately 60% of respondents
to the World Values Survey (2004) either “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement, “work is a duty towards society,”
(question C039) with little variation across countries.
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subject to the moral calculus mentioned above, namely, the more one works relative to the social
standard of behavior, the greater the perception of oneself as industrious and the greater the sense in
which leisure is “well deserved.” The social component of the utility function consists of a weighted
average of the (private) well-being of others, where the weights depend on their industriousness.
The endogenous variables in our model – labor supply, sentiments and taxes – are determined
as follows. First, given their sentiments and the tax schedule, agents make labor supply decisions.
Since there is a continuum of individuals, the labor supply decision has no impact on others and
is therefore made on the basis of private preferences. Next, having determined their labor supplies,
we assume agents evaluate such behavior relative to the moral standard and modify their sentiments
accordingly. Finally, given their sentiments, individuals vote over redistribution, anticipating the labor
supply effects of taxation. Since the tax policy has an economy-wide effect, such voting decisions are
made on the basis of social preferences. The unskilled agents being in the majority, the median tax
policy will be that preferred by an unskilled worker.
A politico-economic equilibrium consists of a vector of labor supplies, sentiments and tax policy
such that each is optimal given the other components and all such variables are compatible. There
are two types of politico-economic equilibria in our model. In a cohesive equilibrium all individuals
conform to the moral standards. In these equilibria all agents receive equal social consideration. The
chosen tax rate might be high relative to the second type of equilibrium. In contrast, in a clustered
equilibrium, society is divided into two groups or clusters. One consists of the most productive
individuals who work above the mean, while the other consists of the least productive individuals
who work below the mean.3 In a clustered equilibrium the chosen tax rate might be lower than in a
cohesive society. Conditional on the strength of work values, whether an economy becomes cohesive
or clustered crucially depends on the degree of inequality of pre-tax income or skill level. If inequality
is below a critical level, then cohesion results, whereas higher inequality leads to social clustering.
The theory provides several implications concerning the relationship between labor supply, inequal-
ity, redistribution and individual attitudes. First, the distinguishing feature of cohesive equilibria is
that all agents adhere to the moral norm. Hence, for low levels of inequality (associated with cohesive
equilibria) we observe little or no dispersion in labor supply, while for high levels of inequality there
is a widening gap between the labor hours of skilled and unskilled workers. Second, the model offers
a plausible explanation of how inequality and redistribution might be inversely related in spite of the
fact that the poor constitute a majority. In a cohesive equilibrium, all agents contribute the same
3If there were more than two skill levels, then there could be a third cluster in equilibrium, where those in the middle
group would conform to the standard.
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level of effort and hence differences in income are solely attributable to the exogenous inequality in
productivities. As such, those with low skill are seen to be poor through no fault of their own. In this
case higher income inequality leads to support for greater redistribution. Such a positive relationship
holds for moderately higher levels of inequality as well. But when productivities are sufficiently differ-
ent that clustering occurs, this may lead to large differences in labor supply. In this case the poor are
seen to be at least partly responsible for their low income and support for redistribution declines. It
follows that we might observe one (cohesive) society with low pre-tax earnings inequality choosing to
redistribute more than another (clustered) society with greater inequality. Moreover, such divergent
attitudes toward the poor are endogenously determined.
The model proposed here affords a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments
and social contracts. In particular, it yields predictions which are in line with the following four well-
documented differences between the United States and Europe.4 First, in the US there is considerably
greater inequality (in both pre-tax income and the distribution of skills) than in continental Europe.5
Second, despite having less inequality, European countries engage in significantly more fiscal redis-
tribution.6 Third, the distribution of work hours is substantially more disperse in the US.7 Finally,
compared to Europeans, a much larger proportion of Americans tend to view poverty as resulting from
laziness.8 These stylized facts, which either conflict with or lie beyond the scope of existing theories,
are reconciled and rationalized by the predictions of our model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes
4See Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) for an extensive discussion of the differ-
ences between the US and continental Europe.
5For instance, in the early nineties the average before-tax Gini coefficient for European countries was 29.1 versus 38.5
for the United States (Deininger and Squire, 1996). By 2000 the gap was 36.0 versus 43.6, respectively and the earning
ratio of the nineteenth and tenth percentile were 2.45 in EU and 4.58 in US (Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). High
school graduates in the US enjoy a skill premium that is about 50 percent larger than in Europe (see Acemoglu, 2003).
6Using OECD data, the share of welfare transfers over GDP in 2007 was 12.7 in the US and 19.6 percent in Europe,
and the share of total government spending for the same year (excluding interest payments) was 36 percent and 45
percent, respectively.
7ILO data for 2000 document that average hours of work are 43.3 for the USA, 40.8 for Germany, 36.9 for France, and
37.6 for The Netherlands. These longer hours in the USA are also differently distributed over the working population.
On average, 65 percent of European workers work the mode number of hours versus 30 percent of US workers. Kuhn and
Lozano (2005) show that, unlike Europe, the highest paid 20 percent of US workers in 2002 were twice as likely to work
long hours than the bottom 20 percent. Also, they find that this phenomenon cannot be attributed to unionization. This
is consistent with the data for the USA from the Current Population Survey for 2008. The weekly work time of workers
with at most a high school degree is 42 hours, while workers with more education work 43.3, and the sample average
is 42.8 hours. Note that even the low skilled US workers work much longer hours that the average of the European
continental countries. These shorter hours in Europe do not seem to result from market regulations or unionization. Bell
and Freeman (2001) find that European workers would prefer to work less rather than more while the opposite is true
for Americans.
8For instance, about 60 percent of Americans versus an average of 20 percent of Europeans believe that laziness is
the main source of poverty (question E131 of World Values Survey, 2004). These figures are unchanged if we restrict
attention to the attitude of low skilled workers toward the poor. This is noteworthy since the unskilled constitute the
majority of the voting population in our model.
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the basic set up, characterizes optimal labor supply and discusses the determination of sentiments.
In Section 4 we examine socioeconomic equilibria, where the tax structure is taken as given. Section
5 studies preferences over redistribution and characterizes politico-economic equilibria in which taxes,
sentiments and labor supply are determined jointly. In Section 6 we specify functional forms which
allow us to analytically characterize the different equilibria and to study explicitly the relationship be-
tween inequality, social cohesion and redistribution. All analytical derivations and proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several literatures. First, it contributes to the literature on endogenous
preferences, both private and social. The latter has been the subject of a number of recent papers
attempting to explain reciprocal behavior. Generally, such papers, including Rabin (1993), Levine
(1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006), have
focused on the interaction among pairs of players where each player attempts to infer the motive of
its partner and then modifies its social preferences accordingly, giving greater weight to partners who
are believed to be benevolent and less weight to those who are selfish or malevolent.9 In contrast, we
consider the interaction among large groups (classes) of agents – hence, no single player is directly
affected by any other – and we evaluate behavior relative to a social norm, with no attempt to infer
motives.
Second, we propose a theory of the interaction between moral norms and individual behavior.10 For
the particular case of norms pertaining to work, seminal contributions by Moffit (1983) and Besley and
Coate (1992) consider the case in which there is stigma associated with living on welfare. Lindbeck,
Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) have extended this analysis to include voting over welfare benefits. There,
individuals can choose between working full-time or being unemployed and receiving a subsidy. Agents
bear a “psychic cost” from deviating from the norm and being stigmatized. However, the magnitude
of this effect depends on the prevalence of such behavior – more common behavior is stigmatized
less. Hence, the observed behavior of others influences the perceived cost of deviating from the norm
9Note that a significant impediment to extending these theories to include more than two players is the difficulty in
imputing motives to a single player when the outcome depends on the behavior of all players.
10Elster (1989) distinguishes rational action in pursuit of future rewards from norm driven behavior. He discusses the
scope of such norms to affect economic behavior – including work norms – and he considers several arguments for their
existence. Some studies attempt to explain the emergence and/or persistence of different ethics or social norms. Lindbeck
et al. (2006) study how parents seek to instill work norms in their children which are sustained by guilt. Tabellini (2007)
studies the adoption and transmission of values of generalized morality. In contrast, the present paper investigates the
economic and political consequences of such norms, taking their existence as given.
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and thereby affecting the decision to do so. Similarly, in our model, the violation of work norms
entails psychological costs. Following the literature in social psychology on self-regulatory emotions,
individuals experience guilt or pride when their behavior respectively falls short or exceeds their own
moral standards. These emotions serve a self-regulatory function: the feeling of guilt for violating the
standard increases moral pressure and induces an individual to undertake reparatory actions. As a
result, moral values and economic incentives jointly determine individual behavior. Our model departs
from the work of Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) in two essential ways. First, we focus on the
intensity of work effort, which here varies continuously, versus the binary choice of working full-time or
living on welfare. This also implies that in our set up moral and economic incentives are non-separable
and jointly influence behavior.11,12 Second, it is crucial in our model that moral judgements befall on
others as well as oneself. It is the contrast between the morally appropriate behavior and observed
behavior that influences esteem.13 This allows us to study how inequality and moral values shape
the social consideration of the different groups and, accordingly, preferences for redistribution and the
social contract.
Third, the paper contributes to the theoretical analysis of rational voting over redistribution. The
seminal contribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981) is extended to include endogenous social prefer-
ences. When voting on redistribution in support of the poor, agents choose the level of redistribution
that maximizes the sum of their egoistic utility and a (generalized utilitarian) social welfare function.
Our modelling is in line with recent empirical evidence suggesting the importance of other-regarding
preferences in explaining support for redistribution to the poor and on the role of moral work values.
Luttmer (2001) provides evidence that attitudes toward redistribution are driven by both self-interest
11In particular, Lindbeck et al (1999) consider agents faced with such discrete choices. There, the moral component
of the utility function is additively separable thus ruling out any influence on the substitution of labor for consumption.
In their paper, “welfare stigma” entails a lump-sum psychological cost. A large body of research documents interactions
between economic and non-economic incentives. Deci et al (1999) have shown definitively that tangible rewards undermine
intrinsic motivation. Kehr (2004) finds that this is the case unless the extrinsic motivation does not deactivate task
enjoyment. Falk and Fehr (2002, p. 713) make the point that “the convention to take the disutility of effort as
exogenously given induces economists to disregard potential determinants of the (dis) utility of effort.”
12See also Bowles and Hwang (2008) for a mechanism design approach studying the role of separability of ethical and
economic incentives.
13Several important contributions, most notably by Be´nabou (2002) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2002 and 2003), have
investigated the related, but different, concepts of self-confidence, self-awareness and self-motivation. These papers
entail incomplete information of the motives of other agents and analyze alternative incentive schemes and signaling
mechanisms. Thus, agents’ motives do not change, but their knowledge of such motives does: observed behavior provides
information with which to update beliefs. In contrast, in our model motives or sentiments do change. That is, observed
behavior directly affects sentiments as well as determining the social standard. Finally, Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg
(2003) and Akerlof and Kranton (2004) also consider cases in which agents derive utility from conforming with a social
norm or belonging to a group. The former considers a similar question of voluntary contributions to a public good, and
the latter investigates group identification and identity. Both focus on self-image rather than passing moral judgement
on others.
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and interpersonal preferences and finds that support for welfare spending decreases with the recipiency
rate in the community. The evidence by Fong (2001), Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) and Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005) show that individuals who believe in the role of hard work support less redistribution.
Fong (2007) finds that unconditional giving increases significantly to recipients who appeared indus-
trious as compared to those who appeared lazy.14 For the interested reader, Alesina and Giuliano
(2009) provides a comprehensive survey including new and recent evidence on individual preferences
for redistribution. To the best of our knowledge no theoretical analysis has studied the link between
social preferences, moral work values and equilibrium redistribution in a unified framework.15 Some
papers consider the issue of voting and redistributive taxation when agents have an ethical point of
view but without the additional element of moral values. Snyder and Kramer (1988) and Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) study the choice of redistribution when individuals care about fairness. Kranich
(2001) provides a theory of voting over redistribution with endogenous labor supply, but when (altruis-
tic) social preferences are given. There, agents vote iteratively on the basis of the current distribution
of income rather than fully anticipating the effect of taxes. Shayo (2009) studies the relationship be-
tween endogenous group identification and redistribution in a model in which group status is affected
by wealth. He shows that demand for redistribution on the part of the poor is lower in equilibria
in which the poor identify more strongly with their nation than with their socioeconomic class. The
results in our paper allow us to qualify the standard median voter hypothesis predicting a positive
and monotonic relationship between inequality and redistribution which, as is now well recognized,
fails to hold in practice. Perotti (1996) reports the lack of any significant linear correlation while some
authors, like De Mello and Tiongson (2006), find evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship
in the OECD countries.16 In line with these findings, our results suggest a possible non-monotonic
relationship between inequality and social attitudes toward redistribution. The social consideration
of each group is related to the labor supply of its members. As a result, there is less support for
progressive redistribution when the poor are considered (partially) responsible for their low income
due to their low effort.
14In their field experiment, Fong and Luttmer (2009) manipulated respondents’ perceptions of the income, race and
deservingness of Katrina victims. They find that subjective support for government spending to help the victims is
significantly affected by deservingness manipulations.
15The role of work values on voting behavior has been recognized for some time in other social sciences (see Kinder
and Sears (1988)) although no formal theory has been proposed.
16Rodriguez (1999) also fails to find evidence within US states. Milanovic (2000), despite finding a negative corre-
lation between inequality and redistribution, finds no evidence that the median voter receives income gains from fiscal
redistribution. See also Be´nabou (1996 and 2000) for extensive surveys of the evidence. Non median voter theories
of redistribution include Roemer (1998) which argues that the redistributive issue may be less salient than others, e.g.
religion, and Rodriguez (2004) which shows that if political influence is exerted by lobbying or campaign contributions,
then larger inequality may lead to low redistribution.
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Finally, the paper contributes to the debate on the cause and interpretation of the observed
differences between the “social contracts” of the United States and continental Europe. There have
been some attempts to explain such differences on the basis of capital market imperfections, the
role of luck versus effort in determining future income, and real or perceived differences in income
mobility. Be´nabou (2000) shows that in the presence of capital market imperfections there is a trade-
off between the efficiency gains from greater redistribution and the efficiency losses from increased tax
distortions. In his model, there are multiple equilibria each associated with a different social contract.17
Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) present a dynamic voting model in which
individuals’ expectations about redistribution and investment in education can be mutually supportive
in equilibrium, thereby affecting the correlation between effort and income. Thus, if agents expect
high taxes, they will be less likely to invest in education, which will reduce their future earnings and
increase the likelihood they will support greater redistribution. Conversely, if they anticipate that
taxes will be low, they will increase educational expenditure and thus earnings and will be less likely
to support redistribution. Be´nabou and Ok (2001) present a model in which the (egoistic) poor face
upward mobility prospects, and they characterize conditions under which the poor would rationally
vote for a moderate level of redistribution. Piketty (1995) investigates the role of beliefs concerning the
relative importance of luck and effort in income production and shows that they can be self-fulfilling.
Similarly, in a model in which individuals have preferences for fairness and vote over taxes, Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) show that there may be multiple, self-supporting equilibria in which a society
that believes that inequality is (unfairly) due to luck will vote for more redistribution which will
reduce the returns to effort and increase the role of luck. This mechanism therefore requires a larger
social mobility in the US compared to Europe in equilibrium. Be´nabou and Tirole (2005) explore the
cognitive hypothesis that individuals may censor evidence on social mobility that conflicts with their
perception of reality, and they study the implications for redistributive politics. The resultant overly
optimistic beliefs tend to moderate support for redistribution. As in the model proposed here, the last
papers provide a rationale for the observation that redistribution in the US is lower than in Europe
despite the larger income inequality. In these papers the explanation crucially rely on the differences in
real (or in the perceived) degree of social mobility.18 In our paper, in turn, the emergence of different
17See Be´nabou (1996) for an excellent and comprehensive survey of the literature on the different channels through
which capital market imperfections create inefficiencies in unequal societies.
18The evidence about the actual differential in social mobility in US and EU is highly debated, however. For ex-
ample the data reported in the OECD report on economic policy growth 2010 (chapter, 5) put into question the
commonly held view that social mobility is larger in the US than in Europe and actually suggest that US has a low
social mobility (similar to France or Italy) while the nordic countries are more mobile. The report is available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/42/44566315.pdf. Concerning the empirical evidence, Fong (2006) finds that moral
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social contracts is not related to different real or perceived level of social mobility but only on to the
different spread in labor supply in the economy. Finally, a novel contribution of the paper, other than
offering a further explanation for the emergence of different social contracts, is that sentiments are
determined endogenously as are the distinct perceptions of the cause of poverty and attitudes toward
the poor. Because the poor are held responsible for their low income in a clustered equilibrium, they
are perceived as being lazy and support for redistribution is low. Conversely, in a cohesive equilibrium
all agents supply the same quantity of labor. Hence, the unskilled have lower earnings for reasons
beyond their control, or due to luck. In this case there is support for greater redistribution. The
ultimate determinant of which type of equilibrium will prevail is the degree of pre-tax inequality.
3 The Model
3.1 Set Up
There are two commodities, consumption c and labor L, and a continuum of agents on [0, 1]. Indi-
viduals are of one of two types, skilled or unskilled, distinguished by their productivities/wages, βs
and βu, respectively, where βu < βs. Average productivity is denoted β while β ≡ (βu, βs) is the
vector of productivities. Let pi denote the proportion of individuals of type s. We assume pi < 12 ,
reflecting the fact that a majority of agents are unskilled. The amount of effective labor supplied by
an individual with productivity βi is βiLi, for i = u, s. We assume output depends linearly on effective
labor so that Y = (1 − pi)βuLu + piβsLs. Labor income is subject to a purely redistributive linear
income tax described by the pair (τ, T ), where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the constant marginal tax rate and T is a
budget-balanced uniform per capita transfer. yi = βiLi is the pre-tax income of individual i and y is
average income. Individual after-tax disposable income is (1− τ)βiLi+T , which we assume is entirely
consumed.
The overall welfare evaluation of an individual of type i, which we denote Vi, is composed of the
sum of two components, private utility, vi, and social utility, wi. The latter captures the effect of i’s
social concern for others and is studied in detail below. Hence, we have
Vi = vi + wi.
Private utility. Focusing first on vi, we assume, as in Lindbeck et al. (1999), that private utility
worthiness is a more robust predictor of attitudes toward redistribution than prospective social mobility.
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depends on consumption, ci, and leisure, li ∈ [0, L] (Li = L− li), as well as on the variable ϕi, which is
related to self-esteem. While ϕi will be determined endogenously through social interaction, for now
we take it as given. We denote ϕ ≡ (ϕu, ϕs) with ϕi ∈
[
ϕ,ϕ
]
.19 Thus, we write
vi = v(ci, li, ϕi).
We assume v is strictly increasing and concave, that consumption and leisure are both normal
goods, and that vcl ≥ 0. We also assume initially that v satisfies the standard Inada conditions.20
Self-esteem ϕi influences the relative enjoyment of consumption and leisure, i.e., their marginal rate
of substitution, according to
d
dϕi
(
vl
vc
)
> 0. (1)
As discussed below, self-esteem evolves depending on the comparison between actual behavior and
what is taken to be appropriate behavior based on the moral standards. Condition (1) therefore
implies that the more one works, the greater the sense of satisfaction at “working hard” and hence
the feeling that additional leisure is “well deserved.”
Social utility. Turning to the social or altruistic component of the utility, we assume wi consists of
a weighted sum of the private utilities of the other agents. The social component of overall utility is
given by
wi = σi,uvu + σi,svs
where σi,j ∈ [0, 1] is the weight that agent i allocates to the group of agents of type j.
3.2 Labor Supply
The choice variables in our model are labor supply, Li, and the voting decision or preferred marginal
tax rate, τi. (T will be determined by balancing the public budget and sentiments will be determined
endogenously as a result of the labor supply decisions.) In this section, however, we focus on the labor
supply decision only, taking the tax policy (and sentiments) as given.
Since there is a continuum of agents, each individual is negligible with respect to the entire economy.
Therefore, their choice of labor supply cannot have a direct effect on the well-being of other agents.
19Since agents differ only in their productivities, all agents of the same type will behave in the same fashion in
equilibrium. Hence, in our behavior-based theory of endogenous sentiments, we assume all such agents of the same type
have the same self-esteem and regard for others.
20We assume the Inada conditions (lim
c→0
vc =∞, lim
c→∞
vc = 0, lim
l→0
vl =∞, and lim
l→L¯
vl = 0) are satisfied in order simplify
the exposition by insuring interior solutions. However, we relax this assumption in the second part of the paper where
we illustrate the working of the model by means of a quasi-linear utility specification.
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Consequently, in determining individual labor supply, only the private component of utility matters.
(The social component will play a role in voting over taxes.) Thus, individual i chooses its labor
supply to maximize its private utility subject to the individual budget constraint that is, i solves
max
Li
v
(
ci, L− Li, ϕi
)
s.t.
 ci = (1− τ)βiLi + TLi ≤ L
Since v is concave and satisfies the Inada conditions, it follows that the labor supply function is
implicitly defined by the first order condition,
vl
(
(1− τ)βiLi + T, L− Li, ϕi
)
vc
(
(1− τ)βiLi + T, L− Li, ϕi
) = (1− τ)βi. (2)
Expression (2) implicitly defines the optimal labor supply as a function of the relevant parameters:
Li = λ((1− τ)βi, ϕi, T ). (3)
Next, we evaluate the comparative statics of labor supply. Totally differentiating with respect to
Li and βi in (2) and assuming that the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect
to labor is low enough insures that labor supply increases with the wage,21
dLi
dβi
> 0 (4)
Note that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor depends on ϕi, thereby
affecting the labor supply decision. From (1) together with the first order condition (2) we have
dLi
dϕi
< 0. (5)
Hence, the marginal effect of an increase in ϕi is to reduce labor supply. As discussed in greater detail
below, low self-esteem ϕi brought on by the perception of oneself as lazy induces guilt which increases
the moral pressure to work. From (4) and (5), the labor supply function characterized in (3) thus
has the property that both higher economic rewards (net wage) and increased moral pressure (low
21See the Appendix. The restriction on the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is unnecessary in the second
part of the paper where we consider quasi-linear utility.
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self-esteem) increase labor effort.
Having determined agents’ labor supplies, we turn now to the issue of how their behavior affects
their self-esteem as well as their consideration of others.
3.3 Work Norms, Self-Regulatory Emotions and Behavior
A vast literature in social psychology studies the role of moral values as determinants of individual
behavior and of social interactions. Rokeach (1973) defines values as general and enduring standards
that help us “to evaluate and judge, to heap praise and fix blame on ourselves and others.” Particularly
important for the economic domain are moral values concerning work and industriousness. As Lukes
(1973) notes, “work values” are crucial in western culture which “... celebrates the virtues of hard
work and sacrifice. It equates idleness with sin.”
There is ample evidence that deviations from social norms or behavioral standards affect both
self-esteem and the consideration of others. Individuals who fail to meet standards loose stature while
individuals exceeding them gain. Similarly, individuals’ self-esteem depends on the comparison be-
tween their own behavior and that of others. Agents who fail to perform according to socially accepted
norms experience guilt while those whose behavior exceeds expectations experience pride. A large and
established body of evidence documents the self-regulatory role of these emotions. As Tangney (2002)
describes, “When we violate important standards, we are inclined to experience negative self-conscious
emotions, such as shame, guilt, and embarrassment. When we meet or exceed standards, we are in-
clined to experience pride and attendant increases in self-esteem. Thus, guilt decreases self-worth
and pride increases it.”22 In addition, the self-regulative role of moral values has been investigated in
experimental settings, where participants who experience guilt are much more likely to comply with
moral standards.23,24
Note that moral values constitute only one of the relevant psychological factors that influence
work effort. Research in social psychology has documented a number of important determinants.25
22For detailed surveys of the literature in social psychology relating social and self consideration to moral standards
we refer the reader to Tangney (2002), Tangney and Dearing, (2002) and Crocker and Park (2003).
23See e.g. Freedman et al. (1967), and Tangney (1995, 2002).
24In addition to the established evidence in experimental psychology, an increasing number of neurobiological studies
document the key role of social self-conscious emotions for moral judgment and behavior (see Greene et al. (2001),
Koenigs et al. (2007) and references therein). Koenigs et al. (2007) discuss previous findings and provide evidence based
on functional magnetic resonance imaging and experiments. They find that patients with focal bilateral damage to the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (the brain region necessary for the generation of social emotions) produce an abnormal
response to moral dilemmas. The findings support the necessary role of social emotions for moral behavior.
25Most of these studies concern work inside organizations rather than in society at large. For example, Latham and
Pinder (2005), in their recent survey of theories and empirical evidence, document the importance of job characteristics
and design and perceived fairness on the job or task enjoyment, along with values and self-regulation. These results
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While we do not wish to dismiss the importance of other factors, here we concentrate on moral values
and moral emotions in order to identify their implications. Similarly, following Rosenberg (1965),
psychologists treat self-evaluation as multidimensional, comprising notions of perceived worth both
in relation to moral standards and in relation to competence in task performance. In particular, the
literature distinguishes between self-esteem, which is affected by self-conscious emotions such as guilt
and pride, and self-confidence, which concerns beliefs about one’s ability to perform. Here, too, we
abstract from issues of doubt concerning competence and restrict our attention to moral values.26
Our modeling of the role of work values is in keeping with the literature on moral values and
self-regulative emotions. We assume agents have standards of appropriate behavior and that they
judge their own behavior and that of others relative to the standard. Those who work more than
the standard are considered industrious and those who work less are considered lazy. This affects the
social consideration they are afforded by other agents. In addition, those whose labor supply exceeds
the norm experience pride and those who work less experience guilt. Such changes in sentiments affect
the both the labor supply decision as well as attitudes toward redistribution. In the case of the former,
the “reparative action” brought on by guilt is to increase one’s labor supply.
To capture this feedback loop between sentiments and behavior, we envision a discrete time ad-
justment process in which labor supply decisions are made on the basis of current sentiments (as
described in the previous section) and sentiments change in response to the labor supply decisions.27
Regarding the consideration of others, we assume social concern is initially distributed in proportion
to population. Then, as agents’ labor supply exceeds or falls short of the social norm, social sentiments
are adjusted according to28
σi,j (t) =
piLj (t− 1)
LMi,j (t− 1)
, (6)
are closely related to the literature on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Deci (1971)). In economics this issue was
first discussed by Kreps (1997) and Frey (1997). Frey and Jegen (2001) survey the theory and evidence on the role of
non-economic motivation. See also Gneezy and Rustichini (2001), Falk and Fehr (2002), and Murdoch (2002).
26Changes in self-esteem and self-confidence also tend to affect behavior differently. While a reduction in self-confidence
(e.g., a decrease in one’s perceived competence in a task) tends to decrease effort, a reduction in self-esteem (e.g. due
to guilt from having failed to meet a standard) tends to increase it. Recently, both concepts have been incorporated
into economic models. Most prominently, Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2006) study the role of self-regulatory emotions and
moral standards, while the cited works by Be´nabou and Tirole study the role of self-confidence in environments with
uncertainty and asymmetric information.
27In spite of the fact that we formally introduce time, the model is essentially static. Our goal is simply to characterize
the fix points of the adjustment process for self-esteem and social consideration. Describing these effects in terms of
a discrete time adjustment process clarifies the information agents have available at the moment of making their labor
supply and voting decisions.
28The assumption that social consideration is allocated in proportion to labor supply is made for simplicity. One could
alternatively assume that deviations from an initial distribution are allocated in proportion to labor supply. This would
allow for an initial bias in favor of the poor when their low earnings occur through no fault of their own. Also, one could
rescale the allocation of social esteem to reflect the findings in Luttmer (2001) that individual support for redistribution
is larger if it helps members of the same group. All qualitative results would be unchanged.
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where Lj (t− 1) is actual labor supply of individual j at time t − 1 while LMi,j (t− 1) represents the
moral standard by which individual i judges j’s behavior. Formulation (6) simply means that the
social concern of agent i for agent j changes depending on j’s past behavior relative to i’s moral
standard.
Similarly, the deviation in one’s own labor supply from the moral standard affects one’s self-esteem
according to
Li (t− 1) ≷ LMi (t− 1) =⇒ ϕi(t) ≷ ϕi (t− 1) , (7)
where LMi (t− 1) is the moral standard to which i holds himself.
In the following, we consider the benchmark where the moral standard is the average labor supply
in the community:
LMi (t) = L
M
i,j (t) = L (t)
which implies that individuals judge themselves and others in comparison to L (t). Notice that this
benchmark ethical rule does not take personal circumstances into account when passing judgement on
others.29
4 Socioeconomic Stationary Equilibria
Thus far we have explained how labor supply is determined in response to the prevailing sentiments
and how sentiments vary with labor supply. Next, we analyze the stationary points of this reciprocal
process. (We address the determination of the tax policy in the following section.) For given level
of redistribution τ we wish to consider combinations of labor supply, self-esteem and social consider-
ation (L,ϕ, σ) such that for each individual i, j = u, s: (a) labor supply Li is optimal according to
(3) given ϕi, and (b) both ϕi and σi,j are stationary given the vector of labor supply L under the
adjustment processes (7) and (6), respectively. Condition (b) says that both social consideration and
self-esteem are consistent with individual performance relative to the moral standard. We refer to
such a combination as a socioeconomic stationary equilibrium, or SE equilibrium for short.
Notice that from (5) and (7) changes in ϕ provide a countervailing force to the complete polarization
of labor supply; those working less than the standard face moral pressure to work more, and vice versa.
29Similarly, in their model of taxpayer resentment as a determinant of welfare stigma, Besley and Coate (1992) link the
stigma to being a welfare recipient, irrespective of personal characteristics. Also Lindbeck et al (1999) assume that the
psychological cost of living on unemployment benefits is not conditional on one’s productivity. As discussed below the
consideration of personal circumstances does not affect the qualitative results as long as individual behavior is judged in
comparison to a social standard.
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This is similar to the welfare stigma effect in Lindbeck et al. (1999) where individuals face moral
pressure to work and avoid the stigma of welfare, and they receive additional utility when they accede
to this moral standard. Here, since self-esteem changes in response to observed relative performance,
there is a tendency to converge to an endogenous social norm concerning effort provision. Nevertheless,
as we shall see below convergence is not always possible.
To simplify notation in the following we simply denote the share of social consideration allocated
to the skill workers by type i as σi,s = σi (which implies σi,u = 1 − σi). There can be two different
types of SE equilibria in which economic behavior and sentiments are mutually compatible. In the first
type, everyone conforms to the moral standard and supplies the average number of work hours. No
agent will have a reason to modify its sentiments for any other agent or its self-esteem. Furthermore,
since in this case all agents supply the same quantity of labor, equilibrium sentiments are such that
σi = pi, for all i. Hence, there is no bias or discrimination in the allocation of social consideration;
i.e., the share of i’s social consideration allocated to the type s agents corresponds to the proportion
of type s agents in the population. Because of this feature and the conformity of behavior, we call
this type of SE equilibrium cohesive. The second type of equilibrium consists of corner solutions of
the process of socioeconomic interactions. In such an equilibrium the population is partitioned into
two groups or clusters, one set of individuals (type s) work above the mean and another set (type u)
work below. In addition the poor are considered partially responsible for their low income due to their
lower labor supply. Sentiments become endogenously polarized: those working below the average will
be regarded as lazy and suffer from both low social consideration and low self-esteem. We call such
an SE equilibrium clustered.
We now characterize the conditions under which either of the two types of SE equilibria exist.
Recall that β is the average productivity while β ≡ (βu, βs) denotes the vector of productivities. For
given β and τ , a cohesive SE equilibrium consists of a vector ϕ such that it is optimal for both types
to supply the same quantity of labor L. We start by noting that when Li = L for all i, the per capita
transfer is given by T = τβL. Using the optimal labor supply characterized in (3), we can identify
the pairs of ϕi and βi for which both types would choose to supply L. This is given implicitly as the
solution to30
λ ((1− τ)βi, ϕi, τβL)− L = 0, for i = u, s. (8)
30Note that while the following expression contains the consistency requirement T = τβL, the first order condition (2),
from which λ is obtained, precludes consideration of the effect of one’s labor supply on aggregate transfers. Therefore,
the following expression should be viewed as an accounting relationship that is required to hold at an SE equilibrium
rather than as a first order condition.
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Next, we investigate the combinations of productivities βu and βs and redistribution, τ , such that
there exist L and ϕi ∈
[
ϕ,ϕ
]
for which (8) is satisfied for both i = u, s. From (5) we know that for
each individual i, there is a maximum labor supply, denoted by Li(τ, βi, β), and a minimum labor
supply Li(τ, βi, β) that are compatible with ϕi being in
[
ϕ,ϕ
]
. These are given implicitly by
Li = λ ((1− τ)βi, ϕ, τβLi) and Li = λ
(
(1− τ)βi, ϕ, τβLi
)
.
The next proposition establishes that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
cohesive SE equilibrium is that the intervals
[
Lu, Lu
]
and
[
Ls, Ls
]
have a non-empty intersection.
Conversely, that the intersection is empty is both necessary and sufficient for there to exist a clustered
SE equilibrium.
Proposition 1. For any (β, τ) the following hold:
i) A cohesive SE equilibrium exists if and only if Lu(τ, βu, β) ≥ Ls(τ, βs, β). In this case there are
generally multiple equilibria. That is, for every Lo ∈ [Ls(τ, βs, β), Lu(τ, βu, β)] there exist ϕu, ϕs ∈[
ϕ,ϕ
]
for which (8) is satisfied at Li = Lo, for i = u, s. In all such equilibria σi = pi for all i.
ii) A clustered SE equilibrium exists if and only if Lu(τ, βu, β) < Ls(τ, βs, β). In this case, the
equilibrium is unique and is given by:
Lu = λ
(
(1− τ)βu, ϕ, T
)
< Ls = λ ((1− τ)βs, ϕ, T )
where ϕu = ϕ, ϕs = ϕ and σi = piLj/L for all i.
This proposition establishes that one or the other, but not both, of the two types of SE equilibrium
will always exist. For any β it may be possible to observe multiple cohesive equilibria parameterized
by the degree of industriousness and sustained by different degrees of moral pressure to work, while,
when it exists, the clustered equilibrium is unique. Whether the equilibria are cohesive or clustered
depends crucially on both the degree of inequality in productivity and the level of redistribution τ . If
inequality in productivity between the skilled and the unskilled is too large, then the moral pressure
to work will be insufficient to overcome the difference in wage payments, and cohesiveness will not be
sustainable. On the other hand, redistribution tends to equalize the economic rewards to labor for the
two types of workers and hence changes the relative return of moral and economic rewards to effort.
These issues are investigated in greater detail in the next section where we consider the endogenous
choice of redistributive policy.
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Before turning to this, however, we highlight the relative differences of the two types of agents in
any stationary equilibrium. In a clustered SE equilibrium the unskilled are poorer and less industrious
than the skilled despite facing larger moral motivation to work.31 Also in any cohesive SE equilibrium
in which (8) is satisfied by both types for the same L, totally differentiating this expression with
respect to βi and ϕi and using (4) and (5), we readily obtain that
∂ϕi
∂βi
> 0.
Hence, in a cohesive equilibrium where all individuals work the same it must be that those who receive
lower economic rewards (a low βi) feel more moral pressure to work (a lower ϕi). The opposite is true
for the more productive workers for which the larger economic incentives make it easier to fulfill the
moral standard.
Proposition 2. In any stationary SE equilibrium the individuals with lower productivity have lower
ϕ, that is, they face higher moral motivation to work than those with high productivity.
This result critically depends on the assumption, standard in social-psychology, that the emotions
produced by deviations from moral standards have a self-regulatory role. In particular, guilt from
failing to meet the work standard decreases self-esteem which increases the moral pressure to work by
increasing the MRS between consumption and leisure. This self-regulatory role of guilt (and conversely
pride) implies that moral values and economic incentives are substitutes. The resulting adjustment
process is stable and leads to work in accordance with the standard unless inequality is excessively
large.32
5 Endogenous Redistribution
So far we have taken τ as given, and we have seen that attitudes and behavior will differ depending
upon the type of socioeconomic equilibrium to emerge. We begin this section by considering the
opposite: what level of redistribution will be chosen by a group of individuals with given sentiments?
We then categorize the effect of taxes in determining the type of SE equilibrium.
31Note that this does not imply that the low skilled work less in a clustered equilibrium than in a cohesive equilibrium.
Indeed, in Section 6 we discuss the possibility that low skilled in a clustered equilibrium work more than the common
amount in a cohesive equilibrium.
32For completeness, in the appendix we include a brief discussion of the case where moral and economic incentives are
complements. We show that for the case of linear utility the maximum level of inequality for which there exist cohesive
equilibria is exactly the same as for the substitute case. Hence, the self-regulative role of moral values is not necessary
for the existence of cohesive equilibria. However, in this case such equilibria are unstable and a clustered equilibrium
would be likely to occur.
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5.1 From Sentiments to Taxes
On the majoritarian choice of income tax schedules we follow the approach developed by Romer (1975),
Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). In our case, unskilled workers constitute the majority
and hence we shall mainly focus on their preferences over taxes. Given their sentiments, individuals
vote over redistribution. When voting, agents are aware of the distortions caused by income taxation
on labor supply and anticipate the existence of a public budget constraint. Therefore, from equation
(3), for given ϕi, the optimal labor supply is a function of the tax rate τ and of the per capita transfers
T : Li (β,ϕ, τ, T ) for i = u, s. Notice, however, that the existence of the public budget allows us to
express the per capita transfer as a function of the tax rate. From the public budget constraint all tax
revenues are used to finance the lump sum transfers. Given optimal labor supply (3) we have that
T = τ [(1− pi)yu (τ, T ) + piys (τ, T )] ≡ τy (τ, T ) (9)
As in Meltzer and Richard (1981), for any τ the assumed normality of leisure insures that the right
hand side of (9) is a strictly decreasing function of T implying that for any τ there exists a unique T
which balances the public budget. This allows us to express the per capita transfer and the individual
indirect private utility as a function of τ only,
νi (τ) ≡ vi
(
(1− τ) yi (τ) + τy (τ) , L− Li (β,ϕ, τ)
)
,
where yi (τ) ≡ βiLi (β,ϕ, τ) and y (τ) ≡ [(1− pi) yu (τ) + piys (τ)].
Denote by Vu (β,ϕ,τ), the indirect utility of individual i = u. The degree of redistribution preferred
by an unskilled worker, denoted τu, maximizes the indirect total utility subject to the public budget
constraint (9), taking into account the induced change in the optimal labor supplies. Therefore, τu is
the solution to the following maximization problem:
τu = arg max
τ∈[0,1]
Vu (β,ϕ,τ) ≡ arg max
τ∈[0,1]
{νu (τ) + [(1− σu)νu (τ) + σuνs (τ)]} .
Consider, first, the preferred level of redistribution of an egoistic agent. The problem is identical
to that in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Its solution, as given by the following first order condition,
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would constitute the majoritarian choice since the unskilled comprise a majority of the population:33
dνu (τ)
dτ
=
∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
+ (1− τ)βu∂Lu
∂τ
]
+
∂vu
∂Lu
∂Lu
∂τ
= 0.
Using the first order condition for labor supply (2), this condition simplifies to
dνu
dτ
=
∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
= 0. (10)
Therefore, the preferred tax rate is increasing in inequality (i.e., y − yu). Let us denote by τ e the tax
rate satisfying the first order condition for an interior optimum in the egoistic case (10).
When individuals have social preferences, their attitude toward redistribution is affected by the
relative consideration of the different groups. The marginal effect on total utility of a variation in τ
is given by
dVu (τ)
dτ
=
∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
+ (11)
+
{
(1− σu)∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
+ σu
∂vs
∂c
[
y − ys + τ dy
dτ
]}
.
Notice that
dVu (τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τe
< 0
which implies that when unskilled workers are socially concerned, they will prefer a tax rate smaller
than τ e. An interior solution for the equilibrium tax rate τu > 0 is characterized by setting (11) equal
to zero and verifying that the indirect utility is locally concave at τ = τu
d2Vu (τ)
dτ2
∣∣∣∣
τ=τu
< 0
These considerations imply the following,
Proposition 3. For any given allocation of social consideration across groups σ, and any (ϕ, β) such
that yu < y, we have that τu < τ e. That is, the majority rule tax rate is smaller than in the egoistic
case. Furthermore, for any interior τu the equilibrium tax is decreasing in σu.
This proposition implies that the individual demand for redistribution is more moderate than in
the egoistic benchmark since agents with social preferences internalize the effect of redistribution on
33In the remainder of the section we use the abbreviated notation Li for Li (β, ϕ,τ), yi for yi (τ), y for y (τ) and Vu(τ)
for Vu(β,ϕ, τ) when no ambiguity will result.
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the well being of others.34 A larger σu implies a reduction of the relative social consideration of the
poor, and, accordingly, the demand for redistribution is lower. As discussed in more detail below, this
implies that the support for redistributive policies in favor of the poor is lower whenever they are held
responsible for the fact that their income is low partly due to their low effort provision.
5.2 From Taxes to Sentiments
Individuals vote over the tax policy as described in the previous subsection. But then the new tax
policy might induce a change in behavior, and this, in turn, might affect agents’ self-esteem and
relative consideration for others. In this subsection we begin to investigate the effect of τ on the type
of stationary sentiments to emerge in equilibrium.
From Proposition 1 we know that for any given level of τ a cohesive equilibrium will emerge
only if the unskilled face sufficient moral pressure to work to overcome the adverse incentive effect of
taxation. Indeed, if τ is too large, this may reduce the return to labor to such an extent that moral
suasion is insufficient even when the moral pressure to work is maximal. The intuition behind this
result hinges on the normality of leisure which implies that, ceteris paribus, the incentive to supply
labor diminishes as fiscal transfers become larger and the tax rate higher. In fact for any given vector
ϕ, the negative effect of taxation on labor supply is stronger for unskilled workers. The logic of the
argument is as follows. Consider again (8), which identifies the quantities of labor compatible with a
cohesive equilibrium: λ ((1− τ)βi, ϕi, τβL)− L = 0 for i = u, s. An increase in τ has two effects. In
the first place it reduces the net wage of both types leading to a lower labor supply. In the second
place, because of the change in the lump-sum transfer, for any given cohesive labor supply L, the
consumption of the unskilled increases. In fact in a cohesive equilibrium the consumption of agent i
is given by ci = [(1− τ)βi + τβ]L = [βi + τ(β − βi)]L. Hence, an individual would consume more
than its pre-tax earnings if and only if its productivity is below the mean. The marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure increases and hence labor supply is reduced. For the
unskilled workers, the two effects go in the same direction and this implies that the labor supply by
the unskilled definitively decreases. For any βL, consumption decreases with τ for the skilled workers
and this tends to increase labor supply. The two effects go in opposite directions so that the net result
is ambiguous. This differential effect of taxation on the labor supply of the different types of agents
implies that if redistribution is too large, then the economic incentives to the unskilled may be too
34Notice also that the level of redistribution preferred by the skilled is always lower than that preferred by the unskilled,
but it is (weakly) larger than the egoistic benchmark. Hence, while the rich oppose any taxation in the egoistic benchmark,
they may support redistribution in this setting. See the Appendix.
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weak. Under these conditions the moral incentives are insufficient to sustain a cohesive equilibrium.
At this level of generality it is not possible to explicitly characterize the link between redistribution
and social cohesion. In order to further investigate the relationship between taxation and sentiments,
we now restrict attention to the family of preferences given by
v(c, l, ϕ) =
c1−θi
1− θ +
1
2
f(Li) (1 + ϕi)
with θ ≥ 0 , f ′ (.) < 0 and f ′′ (.) ≤ 0.
As we shall see, the effect of redistribution on sentiments will critically depend on the relative
productivity of the two types of workers, which we denote by
β˜ ≡ βu
βs
∈ [0, 1] (12)
In line with the previous discussion on the differential role of redistribution on moral and economic
incentives we have the following,
Proposition 4. For any relative productivity β˜, there exists a unique threshold level of redistribution
τ(β˜) ∈ [0, 1] such that for any τ ≤ τ(β˜) only cohesive SE equilibria exist, while for any τ > τ(β˜) only
clustered SE equilibria exist. Furthermore, the larger the gap in productivities the lower the threshold,
i.e., the maximum level of redistribution compatible with the emergence of a cohesive equilibrium:
∂τ(β˜)/∂β˜ > 0.
According to this proposition, the choice of redistribution τ will lead to a cohesive equilibrium if
and only if taxation is sufficiently small. The opposite is true for clustered equilibria. Moreover, the
maximum level of redistribution compatible with cohesive equilibria, τ(β˜), depends on the productivity
ratio. If β˜ is sufficiently large or sufficiently small, then the choice of taxation will have no influence
on the type of equilibrium. If β˜ is large enough, then the difference in wages is small and the economy
always settles in a cohesive equilibrium. On the contrary if β˜, then inequality in productivity is large
and the economy settles in a clustered equilibrium. We state this result in the following.
Proposition 5. There exist two critical levels of relative skills, β˜0 and β˜1 such that τ(β˜0) = 0 and
τ(β˜1) = 1 with 0 ≤ β˜0 ≤ β˜1 < 1. For each τ there is a threshold level β (τ) ∈ [β˜0, β˜1] such that for any
β˜ > β (τ) only cohesive SE equilibria exist while for any β˜ < β (τ) only clustered SE equilibria exist.
Moreover, ∂β (τ) /∂τ > 0.
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If relative productivity β˜ lies outside the range [β˜0, β˜1], the type of equilibrium does not depend
on actual tax rate.
In summary, Propositions 4 and 5 jointly imply that if inequality is too large, that is, if β˜ < β˜0, then
the equilibrium is always clustered for any τ , since τ(β˜0) = 0. On the opposite extreme if inequality
is sufficiently low, β˜ > β˜1, then the equilibrium is always cohesive for any τ , since τ(β˜1) = 1. For
intermediate levels of inequality, the type of equilibrium crucially depends on redistribution: low
taxation produces cohesive equilibria and high taxation clustered equilibria.
6 Politico-Economic Equilibria
In the last section we studied how sentiments affect the choice of taxes and how the level of redistribu-
tion leads to different equilibrium sentiments. We now focus on the full politico-economic equilibrium
of the model (henceforth PE equilibrium) in which sentiments, labor supplies and taxes are each
variable and all are required to be mutually compatible. Thus, a PE equilibrium is characterized
by a vector of labor supply, sentiments and redistribution (L,ϕ, σ, τ) such that the economy is in
socio-economic equilibrium at the tax rate τ is optimally chosen by the median voter.
6.1 Existence and Uniqueness
In order to study the implications of social cohesion more precisely, we now characterize the equilibria
for a restricted class of economies which permit an explicit analytical solution. Specifically, we consider
the following specific form of the utility function,35
v(ci, Li, ϕi) = ci +
1
2
(
1− L
2
i
2
)
(1 + ϕi) ,
with ϕi ∈ [0, 1] . In this case, the labor supply is given by,
Li (βi, ϕi, τ) = (1− τ)βi 21 + ϕi . (13)
As an index of inequality, we use the relative gap between mean and median income,
I ≡ y − yu
y
. (14)
35The linear-quadratic formulation of utility has often been adopted in the literature. See, for example, Piketty (1995)
and Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
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In this case I is proportional to the Gini index, which is given by G = (1− pi) I (see Appendix).
We now define y˜u ≡ [(1− σu)yu + σuys] as the moral perception of mean income where the two
incomes are considered by the moral weights σu and (1 − σu) rather than by the population weights
pi and (1− pi). This reflects the fact that the former may be biased in assigning greater weight to one
group than their population proportion warrants. We take a measure of such bias to be
δ ≡ (y − y˜u)
y
.
Hence, the morally perceived inequality, δ, is the relative difference between the true mean and the
moral perception of mean income. In a cohesive equilibrium σu = pi, and hence δ = 0. In a clustered
equilibrium the poor are considered partially responsible for their low income so that σu > pi and we
have y < y˜u and hence δ < 0. Because of the linearity of the labor supply functions (13) the bias δ
depends on exogenous parameters only and is independent of τ .
The indirect private utility of an individual of type i is given by
v(τ, T, βi, ϕi) =
(1− τ)2 β2i
(1 + ϕi)
+ T (τ) +
1
2
(1 + ϕi) . (15)
Let us now turn to the conditions for an interior optimum for redistribution. Using the labor supply
functions (13), one can show that the indirect total utility is a quadratic function of τ . Furthermore
Vu(0) > Vu(1). Therefore, ∂Vu (0) /∂τ > 0 is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique
interior optimum.
Proposition 6. For any (σ, β, pi) the tax rate τu preferred by the median voter is given by
τu =
I + δ
2 + I + δ
, if pi >
1
2
σu, (16)
and τu = 0 otherwise.
Inspection of (16) reveals that, ceteris paribus, the chosen tax is increasing in I and in δ. As men-
tioned earlier, if agents are not endowed with social preferences, then the problem becomes identical
to Meltzer and Richard (1981) and the demand for redistribution is increasing with inequality I. With
social preferences and given δ, as in Proposition 3, the equilibrium demand for redistribution is more
moderate than under pure egoism. As for the role of the bias in individual sentiments, the direction
in which τu diverges from the benchmark case is determined by the sign of δ. If δ < 0 the support for
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redistribution towards the poor is low since they receive relatively low social consideration. In a sense
in a clustered equilibrium the poor are held partly responsible for their low income due to their lower
effort provision.
We now characterize the PE equilibria. We begin by restating the conditions of Proposition 5.
Due to the linearity of the labor supply function (13) the thresholds β˜0 and β˜1 coincide. To see this,
note that according to (13), the extreme values of Lu (β) and Ls (β) are
Lu (β, τ ) = 2 (1− τ)βu
Ls (β, τ ) = (1− τ)βs.
Hence, an economy is in a cohesive PE equilibrium, i.e., Lu (β, τ ) ≥ Ls (β, τ ), if and only if
βs ≤ L(1− τ) ≤ 2βu. (17)
Expression (17) gives the pairs (τ, L) that are consistent with a cohesive PE equilibrium. From
Proposition 5 and using (17) we have that the economy will be in a cohesive (respectively clustered)
equilibrium only if
β˜ ≥ (<) 1
2
. (18)
Denote by I∗ and Io the level of inequality in cohesive and clustered equilibria, respectively.
By linearity of the labor supply in τ , (13), the level of inequality is independent from the level of
redistribution. Substituting equilibrium labor supply into (14), we obtain
I∗ =
pi
(
1− β˜
)
pi + (1− pi) β˜
if β˜ ≥ 1
2
and Io =
pi
(
1− 2β˜2
)
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜2
if β˜ <
1
2
. (19)
Therefore, we can examine the characterization of the politico-economic equilibrium separately
in the two ranges β˜ ≷ 1/2. We next show that a multiplicity of cohesive equilibria can emerge. In
spite of this all are characterized by the same degree of income inequality, which depends only on the
exogenous ratio of productivity β˜ and group size pi. We have the following:
Lemma 1. The degree of income inequality in a clustered (cohesive) economy is always larger (smaller)
than I and
I∗ (1/2) = Io (1/2) = I ≡ pi
1 + pi
.
Next, we characterize the features of both cohesive and clustered equilibria.
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First, in a cohesive equilibrium all individuals contribute equally to total labor supply so that
social consideration is unbiased: δ = 0. As established above, for any τu there is a range of labor
supplies that can be supported in equilibrium, specifically, those levels given by (17). However, as our
next proposition establishes, there is a unique level of redistribution.
Proposition 7. For any (β, pi) such that I∗ ≤ I, the PE equilibrium is characterized by a unique level
of redistribution given by
τ∗ =
I∗
2 + I∗
. (20)
and by a level L = Lu = Ls satisfying (17) given τ∗ resulting from (20).
For any I < I there is a multiplicity of cohesive equilibria with a unique level of redistribution
τ∗, characterized in (20), and different levels of L satisfying the bounds established in (17). This
multiplicity is sustained by different levels of ϕi. Notice that the range of equilibrium levels of L
shrinks as I gets larger, and in the limit, when I∗ = I, the cohesive equilibrium level of L is unique
and given by L = (1− pi) 2βu + piβs.
Turning now to clustered equilibria the moral bias is given by (see Appendix),
δo = −pi (1− pi) 1− 2β˜
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜
1− 2β˜2
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜2
. (21)
We know from Proposition 5 that if income inequality is large enough, i.e. Io > I, only clustered
equilibria exist. In these equilibria both inequality I characterized in (19) and the moral bias (21) do
not depend on the tax rate. The equilibrium level of redistribution in clustered equilibria is therefore
characterized in,
Proposition 8. For any (β, pi) with Io ≥ I, there exists a threshold Ic ∈
(
I, 1
)
such that the unique
clustered PE equilibrium tax is given by
τ o =
{
Io+δo
2+Io+δo if I ∈
[
I, Ic
)
, (22)
where Io is given in (19) and δo in (21), while τ o = 0 if I ∈ (Ic, 1].36
In the clustered equilibrium, differently from a cohesive one, the level of equilibrium redistribution
depends on both the level of income inequality I and the moral bias δ.
36For clustered equilibria, the condition identifying Ic can be rewritten as σu ≥ 2pi, which at the equilibrium value of
σu (from (6)) is equivalent to β˜ ≤ (1− 2pi) /4 (1− pi). Using this information, one can obtain the unique threshold Ic
from (19).
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6.2 Inequality, Industriousness, Social Cohesion and Redistribution
We now investigate the relationship between income inequality and equilibrium redistribution. In the
previous subsection we saw that for low levels of inequality there is generally a continuum of cohesive
PE equilibria. But for all such equilibria, inequality is the same and given by I∗ in (19), which
depends only on the exogenous parameters pi and relative productivity β˜. For high levels of inequality
the economy has a unique clustered PE equilibrium, with the corresponding degree of inequality given
by Io in (19). In this case, too, the clustered PE equilibrium tax τ o depends – via δo – on pi and β˜,
as well as on Io. In the following exercise, we hold the groups size, pi, constant and classify different
economies/levels of inequality by variations in relative productivity β˜.
We have the following,
Lemma 2. For I ≤ I, δ = 0, and for I > I, δ < 0 with ∂δ/∂I < 0.
Lemma 2 characterizes the bias δ for economies with different inequality. While in any cohesive
equilibrium δ = 0, in clustered equilibria there is a bias against those perceived as lazy. Furthermore,
the bias is increasing with inequality since it is associated to larger differences in labor supply between
the unskilled and the skilled.
Finally we characterize the equilibrium level of redistribution as a function of inequality. The
following Proposition establishes the relationship between inequality and equilibrium redistribution
in both cohesive and clustered economies. The observation that the bias δ is increasing in inequality
implies that the equilibrium level of redistribution may be non-monotonic.
Proposition 9. For any pi the following hold:
(i) For any I ≤ I, the economy is in a cohesive PE equilibrium and the level of redistribution τ∗
is strictly increasing in inequality.
(ii) For any I ≥ I, the economy is in a clustered PE equilibrium and the level of redistribution
τ o is a non-monotonic function of inequality: there exists a level of inequality Is > I at which τ o is
maximal. Furthermore, for any I ≥ Ic > I, τ o = 0.
Figure 1 illustrates these findings.
Proposition 9 states that in cohesive economies, higher inequality is always associated with higher
taxation. But as inequality increases beyond the threshold and the economy becomes clustered, even-
tually the equilibrium tax rate declines. Hence, the model predicts a non-monotonic relationship
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Figure 1: Inequality, Social Clustering and Redistribution
between inequality and redistribution.37 The intuition behind this result is as follows. Individual
utility combines an egoistic component and a social component. Consider, first, the case of an econ-
omy with a low inequality settling in a cohesive equilibrium. As in the standard non-altruistic utility
benchmark, the egoistic component would lead to an increase in taxation in response to higher in-
equality. As for the social component, because of the absence of any bias in a cohesive equilibrium, it
would mimic the choice of taxation by a utilitarian social planner. Hence, when we take the two com-
ponents together, an increase in inequality would unambiguously lead to an increase in taxation. In
clustered economies, the low skilled individuals work below average and, as a result, their low income
is partially attributable to their low effort. As a result the support for redistribution in favor of the
poor is reduced since they are held partly accountable for their low income. The strength of the bias
in social sentiments depends on the level of skill inequality and labor supply dispersion. From Lemma
2, the higher the inequality, the larger is the gap in the two labor supplies, and hence the stronger the
bias and the lower the support for redistribution stemming from the social component of utility. In
this case, the egoistic and the social component of the utility work in opposite directions. For values
of inequality slightly above I the degree of social clustering and the associated bias in sentiments are
small. Under these conditions the positive effect dominates and an increase in inequality leads to an
increase in redistribution. However, for a sufficiently high degree of inequality, the increase in the
gap of labor supplies and the associated bias eventually dominates and the support for redistribution
diminishes.
Before concluding it is useful to highlight that the determination of the type of equilibrium in terms
of social cohesion and the bias δ crucially depends on relative labor supply which, in turn, depends
37For illustrative purposes we have expressed the relationship between redistribution and the inequality index I. Since
the Gini index is given by G = (1− pi) I, the non-monotonic relationship described in Proposition 9 holds also once
expressed in terms of Gini coefficients as proved in the Appendix.
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on relative productivity β˜, and not absolute labor supply. When comparing across equilibria with
different levels of inequality (interpreted as different economies), it is possible to observe, for instance,
a larger bias against the poor in more industrious economies, i.e. those with higher average labor
supply, than in economies with lower average labor supply and lower dispersion of hours of work. The
reason for this is that the moral judgment which befalls workers is relative to the economy-specific
moral standard which, here, is the endogenously determined average labor supply. Thus, for instance,
the low skilled workers in a clustered equilibrium may work more than the low skilled in a cohesive one
but still be considered lazy if their labor supply relative to the skilled workers in their own economy is
lower than the relative labor supply in the cohesive economy. Accordingly, the level of redistribution
in their favor may be lower.38 When applied to the case of the US and Europe, this discussion clarifies
that it may be that the poor in the US are perceived to be lazy because these workers are held to a
more industrious economy-specific work standard.39
7 Concluding Remarks
There is increasing awareness that moral values play a crucial role in determining individual behavior,
social interactions and individual views on social policies. In this paper, we have presented a model in
which agents have moral standards of behavior relative to which they judge the work effort of others as
well as their own. By affecting the social consideration of others and self-esteem, such moral calculus
influences both voting and labor supply decisions. To examine this issue, we have generalized the
seminal work of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to include rational voting over redistribution when agents
have endogenously determined private and social preferences. The proposed framework allows us to
analytically characterize the equilibria and the role of inequality.
We find that two types of politico-economic equilibria might emerge. In a cohesive equilibrium,
all agents conform to the standard of behavior and income inequality is based solely on exogenous
38For example consider two economies, which we denote A and E. Suppose pi = .3, ϕ = 0, and ϕ = 1 in each.
Also assume βAu = β
E
u = 1 and β
E
s = 1.96, β
A
s = 5.8. These numbers are for illustration but are not too far from the
earning ratios of 2.45 in EU and 4.58 in US cited in footnote 5 in the Introduction. Given these productivities we have
β˜A = 0.17 < 1
2
, β˜E = 0.51 > 1
2
. Hence, A is clustered and E is cohesive. There is a continuum of cohesive equilibria in E
with a minimum common labor supply LE = 0.9 and a maximum labor supply LE = 1.8. The clustered equilibrium is
unique with LAu = 1.9 and L
A
s = 5.6. The equilibrium levels of redistribution are τ
o = 0.05 and τ∗ = 0.1 in the clustered
and cohesive equilibria, respectively. Hence the unskilled workers in the clustered equilibrium work more than the (most
industrious) unskilled workers in the cohesive ones. This configuration is sustained by a lower level of redistribution.
This simple example is just an illustration that the relative productivity is what matters in the determination of social
clustering.
39The stylized evidence concerning labor supply in the US and the continental Europe suggest that this might be indeed
the case. In fact, as briefly discussed above, the US displays both larger average labor supply and larger dispersion in
labor hours than continental Europe.
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differences in skill levels. As a result, voters are relatively supportive of redistribution since the
unskilled are perceived to be poor through no fault of their own since they behave in line with the
moral standards prevailing in their community. In this case, the self-regulatory emotions of guilt
or pride provide the moral inducement to comply with the endogenously determined work standard.
Such an equilibrium is possible if the disparity in skills, or, equivalently, pre-tax income inequality,
is not too large. However, if productivity differences are sufficiently large and such emotions fail to
provide the necessary incentives, then a clustered equilibrium will occur in which agents choose to
supply different quantities of labor. In this case, the poor are seen to be at least partially responsible
for their low income and the support for redistributive taxation diminishes. The type of equilibrium
to emerge depends crucially on the degree of pre-tax inequality.
The model affords several predictions on the relationship between labor supply, income inequal-
ity, redistributive taxes and attitudes toward the poor. First, it predicts a possibly non-monotonic
relationship between inequality and the level of taxation. Thus, it is possible that a clustered equi-
librium could involve higher inequality and lower taxes than a cohesive equilibrium. It also predicts
the endogenous emergence of work norms. We should expect little dispersion in work hours when
productivity differences are small. As societies become more unequal, however, labor supply becomes
increasingly dispersed. The different equilibria lead to, and are sustained by, quite different views of
the cause of poverty and attitudes toward the poor. The model yields predictions that appear broadly
consistent with salient differences between observed social contracts in the US and continental Europe.
The benchmark moral rule we consider represents a strict work ethic which takes into consideration
only the number of hours worked and abstracts entirely from personal characteristics such as individual
productivities. This implies that labor supply is interpreted as a signal of individual ”industriousness”
rather than as a reflection of economic opportunities. One argument in favor of such an ethical rule is
that labor hours are observable yet the motives underlying such decisions often are not. Nevertheless,
it is important to notice that the predictions of the model depend on the assumed moral rule. For
instance, considering the opposite extreme where moral standards are fully adjusted for individual
differences in wages would imply that the required labor supply of each agent fully discounts his
market productivity and no social clustering could be observed in equilibrium. For intermediate work
ethics, individuals would be judged on the basis of their labor supply with a partial, but not full,
correction that accounts for wage differences. This suggests that the stricter the work ethic the more
likely it is to observe social clustering. The predictions of the model about the different social contracts
would therefore be reinforced if, for instance, the US has a stricter work ethic than Europe. Exploring
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the implications of alternative ethical rules for the social contract as well as studying the emergence
and persistence of moral standards and the formation of beliefs are important tasks for future research.
Finally, the paper can be seen as part of a larger effort to explore the interaction between moral
values, sentiments, behavior and social policy. Clearly, the composition of society, that is, the attitudes
and sentiments of its members, shapes the institutional environment. But the converse is true as
well: institutions affect behavior, and this, in turn, affects the sentiments of the constituents. Full
consideration of this reciprocal effect requires that social policy, individual behavior and sentiments
be determined jointly. This seems particularly true in considering such morally relevant conduct as
honesty and cooperation which are likely to influence individual behavior, preferences over policies
and the perception of others. While we have restricted our attention to the specific role of work norms
and fiscal redistribution, this behavior-based approach to the study of moral sentiments might be
applicable in other policy areas as well.
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8 Appendix.
Optimal Labor Supply and Comparative Statics. Substituting for ci and differentiating private
utility v with respect to Li, we obtain
∂v
∂Li
= vc ((1− τ)βiLi + T, li, ϕi) (1− τ)βi − vl ((1− τ)βiLi + T, li, ϕi) . (23)
Differentiating again, we have
∂2v
∂L2i
= vcc (.) (1− τ)2 β2i − 2vcl (.) (1− τ)βi + vll (.) ≡ D < 0.
By setting (23) equal to zero we get (2). Totally differentiating with respect to Li and βi in (2), we
have
dLi
dβi
= − 1
D
(1− τ) {vcc(.) (1− τ)βiLi + vc(.)− vcl(.)Li} , (24)
where −1/D > 0. Let us denote by εvc,L the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with
respect to labor, that is,
εvc,L = [vcc(.) (1− τ)βi − vcl(.)]Li/vc(.).
Then (24) can be written as
dLi
dβi
= − 1
D
(1− τ)(εvc,L + 1)vc(.). (25)
If |εvc,L| < 1 than dLi/dβi > 0.
To determine the effect of ϕi on the labor supply decision, first differentiate (2) to obtain,
dLi
dϕi
= − 1
D
[vcϕ(.) (1− τ)βi − vlϕ(.)]. (26)
Notice that differentiating and using the first order condition for optimal labor supply (2), we can
rewrite (1) as
∂
∂ϕi
(
vl
vc
)
=
[
1
vc
(vlϕ − vcϕ (1− τ)βi)
]
=
=
(
vl
vc
ϕi
)(
vlϕ
ϕivl
− vcϕ
ϕivc
)
=
(
vl
vc
ϕi
)
(εvl,ϕ − εvc,ϕ).
Hence, condition (1) is equivalent to assuming the elasticity of the marginal utility of leisure with re-
spect to self-esteem is larger than the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, [εvl,ϕ − εvc,ϕ] >
0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given that labor supply is monotonically increasing in individual pro-
ductivity βi from (25), we know that Lu(τ, βu, β) < Ls(τ, βs, β) and Lu(τ, βu, β) < Ls(τ, βs, β).
It is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a cohesive equilibrium that Lu(τ, βu, β) ≥
Ls(τ, βs, β), i.e., that there is some L that satisfies (2) for both u and s at T = τβL and that
every such L is a cohesive SE equilibrium labor supply in which (ϕu, ϕs) solves (8) for i = u, s. We
next show that under these conditions clustered equilibria cannot emerge. Suppose Lu(τ, βu, β) ≥
Ls(τ, βs, β) and, to the contrary, suppose there is also a clustered equilibrium in which L = (Lu, Ls),
Lu 6= Ls. First, if Lu < Ls, since this is stationary, it must be that ϕu = ϕ and ϕs = ϕ. But then
Lu = Lu(τ, βu, β) and Ls = Ls(τ, βs, β), which contradicts Lu(τ, βu, β) > Ls(τ, βs, β). Alternatively,
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if Lu > Ls, then in this case stationary implies ϕu = ϕ and ϕs = ϕ. Hence, Lu = Lu(τ, βu, β) and
Ls = Ls(τ, βs, β). Therefore, Lu(τ, βu, β) > Ls(τ, βs, β). Since Ls(τ, βs, β) > Lu(τ, βu, β), as shown
above, this implies Lu(τ, βu, β) > Lu(τ, βu, β), which is also a contradiction. It remains to be shown
that Lu(τ, βu, β) < Ls(τ, βs, β) is sufficient for the existence of a clustered equilibrium. However, if
Lu(τ, βu, β) < Ls(τ, βs, β) and ϕu = ϕ and ϕs = ϕ, then the conditions of the definition of a clustered
SE equilibrium are clearly satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3. Rearrange (11) to get
∂vu
∂c
(2− σu))
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
= −σu∂vs
∂c
[
y − ys + τ dy
dτ
]
. (27)
Since dydτ < 0 and ys > y, the RHS is positive. Hence, the LHS must be positive as well which
implies
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
> 0. (28)
If that is the case, then from (10) dνudτ > 0 at τ
u . Hence τu < τ e, or the level of redistribution
preferred by the poor is smaller than in the egoistic case.
As for the effect of σu on τu, implicit differentiation yields
sign
∂τu
∂σu
= sign
(
−∂
2Vu/∂τ∂σu
∂2Vu/∂τ2
)
=
= sign
{
−∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
+
∂vs
∂c
[
y − ys + τ dy
dτ
]}
< 0.
From (11) and (28) and noting that by second order condition of a maximum ∂2Vu/∂τ2
∣∣
τu
< 0
we have that
∂τu
∂σu
< 0.
Finally, as for the preferences of the skilled workers we have that
dVs (τ)
dτ
= (1− σs) ∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
+
∂vs
∂c
(1 + σs)
[
y − ys + τ dy
dτ
]
. (29)
Since
[
y − ys + τ dydτ
]
< 0, a purely egoistic skilled worker would optimally choose τ = 0 (from the
analogue of (10) for s). In an interior solution of (29)
∂vs
∂c
(1 + σs)
[
y − ys + τ dy
dτ
]
= − (1− σs) ∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
. (30)
As above, this implies
[
y − yu + τ dydτ
]
> 0 at the solution τ s . Hence 0 ≤ τ s < τ e as well. Next we
show that τu > τ s even in the case in which τ s > 0, that is, when (30) holds with equality. Now, we
compare the coefficients of the positive expression ∂vu∂c
[
y − yu + τ dydτ
]
in (30) and (27). Evaluating
dVs (τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τu
=
∂vs
∂c
[
y − ys + τ dy
dτ
]
− ∂vu
∂c
[
y − yu + τ dy
dτ
]
+
dVu (τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τu
< 0
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since dVu(τ)dτ
∣∣∣
τ=τu
= 0. Hence, τu > τ s ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. The first order condition for labor supply can be
expressed as
[(1− τ)βiLi + T ]−θ (1− τ)βi = −12f
′ (Li) (1 + ϕi) .
In a cohesive SE equilibrium where Li = L for all i, and T = τβL, this can be written as
−f ′ (L)Lθ = 2
1 + ϕi
[(1− τ)βi + τβ]−θ (1− τ)βi,
where the LHS is strictly increasing in L while the RHS is independent of L. From this expression,
we have that the necessary and sufficient condition stated in Proposition 1 holds if and only if
1
1 + ϕ
[(1− τ)βu + τβ]−θ βu ≥ 11 + ϕ [(1− τ)βs + τβ]
−θ βs.
Rearranging the last expression, we have that a cohesive SE equilibrium exists if and only if(
βu
βs
)1/θ
≥
(
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
)1/θ [(1− τ)βu + τβ
(1− τ)βs + τβ
]
. (31)
After some manipulation, (31) can be rewritten as
(
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
)1/θ (
β˜
)1/θ ≥
 β˜ (1− τ) + τ
(
(1− pi) β˜ + pi
)
(1− τ) + τ
(
(1− pi) β˜ + pi
)
 = (32)
=
β˜ (1− τ) + τ
(
(1− pi) β˜ + pi
)
± (1− τ)
(1− τ) + τ
(
(1− pi) β˜ + pi
) =
= 1− (1− τ)
(1− τ) + τ
(
(1− pi) β˜ + pi
) ,
which can be written as
H
(
β˜
)
≡
(
β˜
)1/θ ≥ (1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
)1/θ1−
(
1− β˜
)
1 + (τ/(1− τ))
(
(1− pi) β˜ + pi
)
 ≡ G(β˜, τ)
(
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
)1/θ
.
(33)
Consider the RHS and the LHS of (33) in the space β˜ ∈ [0, 1]. First, H (.) is strictly increasing
and either strictly concave for θ > 1, strictly convex for θ < 1, or linear for θ = 1. Also, H(0) = 0 and
H(1) = 1.
Notice that G
(
β˜, τ
)
is strictly increasing in τ with G
(
β˜, 0
)
= β˜ and G
(
β˜, 1
)
= 1. In particular
denote by β˜1 the level of relative productivity such that (33) is satisfied with equality for τ = 1. This
is given by
β˜1 =
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
< 1. (34)
Also, denote by β˜0 ∈ [0, 1] the relative productivity at which (33) is satisfied with equality for τ = 0,
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which is given by40
β˜0 =
(
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
) 1
1−θ
< 1 for any θ < 1 and β˜0 = 0 for any θ ≥ 1.
Clearly, for θ ≥ 1, β˜1 > β˜0. But also for θ < 1, since 1+ϕ1+ϕ < 1 and 11−θ > 1, β˜1 > β˜0. Therefore, we
have an upper bound β˜1 (that is, a lower bound for inequality) such that for any β˜ ≥ β˜1 only cohesive
SE equilibria exist and a lower bound β˜0 such that for any β˜ < β˜0 only clustered SE equilibria exist.
This proves Proposition 5.
Proposition 4 is proved by noting that by the monotonicity of G
(
β˜, τ
)
in τ and the Intermedi-
ate Value Theorem, for any β˜′ ∈
[
β˜0, β˜1
]
there always exists a unique interior τ
(
β˜′
)
such that if
τ > τ
(
β˜′
)
, then only clustered equilibria are possible, while if τ ≤ τ
(
β˜′
)
, only cohesive equilib-
ria exist. Also the larger β˜′ the larger the required τ necessary to make the functions H
(
β˜
)
and
G
(
β˜, τ
)(
1+ϕ
1+ϕ
)1/θ
cross exactly at β˜′.
Proof of Proposition 6. Using (13) we can express the indirect utility of individual i as
Vi(τ) =
1 + ϕi
2
+
[
(1− σu) 1 + ϕu2 + σu
1 + ϕs
2
]
+ (1− τ)2
{
β2i
1 + ϕi
+
[
(1− σu) β
2
u
1 + ϕu
+ σu
β2s
1 + ϕs
]}
+ (1− τ) τ4
[
(1− pi) β
2
u
1 + ϕu
+ pi
β2s
1 + ϕs
]
.
which is a quadratic function in τ . Differentiating and evaluating at τ = 0, we have the condition
V ′u (0) =
(
β2s
1 + ϕs
− β
2
u
1 + ϕu
)
((pi − σu) + pi)
Using the labor supply functions (13), we have that
(
β2s
1+ϕs
− β2u1+ϕu
)
> 0 in any stationary equilib-
rium. This implies that there can be a unique interior optimum. Using (13), we obtain the following
expressions for the effects of τ on labor, gross earnings and transfers, respectively:
dLi
dτ
= − Li
1− τ ,
dyi
dτ
= − yi
1− τ and
dT
dτ
=
1− 2τ
1− τ y.
Differentiating the egoistic (indirect) utility vi (15) with respect to τ , we obtain
dvi
dτ
= y − yi − τ1− τ y.
Then differentiating the total indirect utility with respect to τ , we get the first order condition
dVu
dτ
= 2
1− 2τ
1− τ y − yu − y˜
u = 0. (35)
which, after rearranging, yields (16).
40One solution is always β˜0 = 0 while the second solution is in the range [0, 1] only if θ ≤ 1.
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Inequality in Cohesive and Clustered Equilibria. Proof of Lemma 1 Substituting the
equilbrium labor supply in cohesive and clustered equilibria into (14), we obtain (19). In order to
compare income inequality across the two types of equilibria, consider economy A with β˜A which is
clustered (β˜A < 12) and economy B with β˜B which is cohesive (β˜B ≥ 12). Observe that Io in (19) is
strictly decreasing in β˜. Also, note that β˜A < 1/2 < β˜B implies 2β˜2A < 1/2 < β˜B. The Lemma is
proved by evaluating (19) at β˜ = 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 2. The range of inequality I for which the economy is in a cohesive/clustered SE
equilibrium is characterized in Propositions 7 and 8. From (6) and (13), in any clustered equilibrium
the bias in social sentiments is given by
σu =
piβu
(1− pi) 2βu + piβs . (36)
In this case the magnitude of the distributive bias δ is given by
δ =
(y − y˜u)
y
=
(1− pi) 2β2u + piβ2s − (1− σu)2β2u − σuβ2s
(1− pi) 2β2u + piβ2s
. (37)
Using (36) and rearranging, we can express the numerator of (37) as
(1− pi) 2β2u + piβ2s − 2β2u +
piβs
(1− pi) 2βu + piβs
(
2β2u − β2s
)
=
pi
(
β2s − 2β2u
)(
1− βs
(1− pi) 2βu + piβs
)
= −pi (1− pi)
(
β2s − 2β2u
)
(βs − 2βu)
(1− pi) 2βu + piβs .
Therefore,
δ(I) = −pi (1− pi) 1− 2β˜(
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜
) 1− 2β˜2(
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜2
) < 0 for β˜ < 1
2
.
Computing the level of income inequality one gets
I =
pi
(
1− 2β˜2
)
(
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜2
) , (38)
which implies
δ = − (1− pi) I 1− 2β˜(
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜
) < 0.
From (38) we have
∂I
∂β˜
= − 4piβ˜(
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜2
)2 < 0. (39)
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The bias in social sentiments is increasing in I since
∂δ
∂I
= − (1− pi) 1− 2β˜(
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜
) + I ∂
∂β˜
− (1− pi) 1− 2β˜(
pi + (1− pi) 2β˜
)
 ∂β˜
∂I
= (40)
=
δ
I
+ 2I (1− pi) ∂β˜
∂I
< 0,
which proves the statement.
Proof of Proposition 9. (i) It is immediate from (20), that ∂τ∗/∂I∗ > 0.
(ii) From Lemma 2, in clustered equilibrium δ (I) < 0 and ∂δ∂I < 0. And from Proposition 8 the
equilibrium level of redistribution is τ (I) = δ+I2+δ+I . Therefore,
∂τ o
∂I
=
1
(2 + δ + I)2
(
1 +
∂δ
∂I
)
≷ 0⇐⇒ 1 ≷
∣∣∣∣∂δ∂I
∣∣∣∣ .
Recall that I = I = pi1+pi ⇔ β˜ = 1/2, and δ(I) = 0. Then from (39) evaluated at β˜ = 1/2 we obtain
∂β˜
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣
I=I
= −(1 + pi)
2
8pi
.
Hence, from (40) we have ∂τ
o
∂I
∣∣
I=I
= 1
(2+I)2
(
3−pi2
4
)
> 0. Notice also that from Proposition 8, there
exists a level of inequality I ′ > I such that τ o = 0. Hence, by continuity of τ o (I) and by Intermediate
Value Theorem there exists a level Is for which τ o is maximal.
Redistribution as a function of the Gini Index. From Proposition 9 we know that redistri-
bution is maximal for some I > I and the maximum value it is implicitly characterized by maximizing
(16). Denote the preferred level of redistribution as function of inequality as τ = φ(I). Differentiating,
we have
dτ = φ′(I)dI. (41)
Computing the Gini index for disposable income, we get G = (1− τ) (1− pi) I. By totally differenti-
ating we have
dI =
1
(1− τ) (1− pi)dG+
G
(1− τ)2 (1− pi)dτ .
Substituting and rearranging,
dτ
[
1− φ
′(I)G
(1− τ)2 (1− pi)
]
= dG
φ′(I)
(1− τ) (1− pi) .
Therefore,
dτ
dG
=
φ′(I) (1− τ)
(1− τ)2 (1− pi)− φ′(I)G = 0⇔ φ
′(I) = 0, (42)
which implies that the change in redistribution as a function of the Gini index co-moves with the
change in pre-tax income inequality I.
Self-esteem and labor supply. Following the literature in social psychology, we have considered
the case in which the emotions produced by deviations from moral standards have a self-regulatory
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role. The self-regulative role of moral values on labor supply, and in particular equation (1), is key
for the stability of cohesive equilibria. To see this suppose for a moment that moral and economic
incentives were complements, i.e. that the MRS between consumption and leisure were to decrease
with ϕ. Failure to meet the standard would lower the moral pressure to work and this would result in
negative rather than positive effect on labor supply. In spite of inverting the effects of guilt on labor
supply, cohesive equilibria would still be possible for low levels of inequality and otherwise equilibria
would be clustered. The difference is that now cohesive equilibria are unstable: those working less than
the mean would tend to reduce their labor supply in response to moral pressure and those working
more would tend to increase theirs. Hence, clustered equilibrium is an absorbing state.
Formally, instead of (1), assume
d
dϕi
(
vl
vc
)
< 0. (43)
For example, in the case of linear-quadratic utility as in Section 6, we might assume
v(ci, Li, ϕi) = ci + 2
(
1− L
2
i
2
)
1
1 + ϕi
(44)
In that case the optimal labor supply would be
Li (βi, ϕi, τ) = (1− τ)βi 1 + ϕi2
instead of Li (βi, ϕi, τ) = (1− τ)βi 21+ϕi . This implies that an increase in ϕi would lead to an increase
rather than a decrease in labor supply. Hence, for any βi the maximum labor supply is attained at
ϕi = ϕ rather than at ϕi = ϕ, as in the text.
From the Proof of Proposition 5 we know that for the utility formulation used in Section 6 the
critical value
β˜1 =
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
< 1
divides the range of productivity ratios such that for any β˜ > β˜1 only cohesive equilibria exist, while
for any β˜ < β˜1 only clustered equilibria exist. By a similar argument, using the utility formulation
(44), we have that in a cohesive equilibrium
Lu (βu, ϕu, τ) = Ls (βs, ϕs, τ)⇐⇒ βu (1 + ϕu) = βs (1 + ϕs) . (45)
As in the text, an increase in the productivity spread leads skilled workers to work relatively more.
This can be compensated, however, by a lower ϕi. Therefore, a cohesive equilibrium can be sustained
as long as
βu (1 + ϕ) ≥ βs
(
1 + ϕ
)⇐⇒ β˜ ≥ 1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ
, (46)
which is precisely the same threshold as in the case considered in the text. This implies that cohesive
equilibria can be sustained only if the productivity difference is not too large. Thus, what explains
cohesive equilibria is not the substitutability between economic and moral incentives but rather the
relative extremes of the two. Notice, however, that a cohesive equilibrium as in (45) is not stable.
Any deviation leads dynamically to a clustered equilibrium. Consider, for example, the case in which
Ls > Lu. From the dynamic evolution of self-esteem and social esteem this leads to an increase in ϕs
and a decrease in ϕu. As result we observe a further increase in the gap Ls−Lu. The process continues
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until a clustered equilibrium is reached with ϕs = ϕ , ϕu = ϕ and Ls (ϕ) > Lu
(
ϕ
)
.41 As in the text,
this clustered equilibrium is unique when inequality is sufficiently large, i.e. β˜ <
1+ϕ
1+ϕ . Hence, the role of
the self-regulatory function of changes in self-esteem, as in (1), is to insure the stability of equilibrium.
Finally, notice that the result on the non-monotonic behavior of equilibrium redistribution does not
depend on the self-regulatory role of emotions since it is induced by the increasing bias against the
poor in clustered equilibria.
41In fact in this case a clustered equilibrium with ϕu = ϕ, ϕs = ϕ and Lu (ϕ) > Ls(ϕ) can also be sustained. This
equilibrium, however, disappears when inequality is sufficiently large, that is if β˜ <
1+ϕ
1+ϕ
.
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